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Abstract
Privacy and security are paramount in the proper deployment of location-based services (LBSs). We present a novel protocol based
on user collaboration to privately retrieve location-based information from an LBS provider. Our approach does not assume that
users or providers can be completely trusted with regard to privacy, and does not rely on a trusted third party. In addition, user
queries, containing accurate locations, remain unchanged, and the collaborative protocol does not impose any special requirements
on the query-response function of the LBS. Our protocol is analyzed in terms of privacy, network traffic, and processing overhead.
We define the concept of guaranteed privacy breach probability, and we show that our proposal provides exponential scalability in
that probability, at the expense of a linear relative network cost.
Key words: Location-based services, private information retrieval, location privacy, trusted third parties, untrusted user collaboration
1. Introduction
The opening up of enormous business opportunities for
location-based services (LBSs) is the result of recent ad-
vances in wireless communications and positioning tech-
nologies. 3G technology makes mobile wireless communi-
cations faster than ever, and highly accurate positioning
devices based on GPS are widely accessible to the general
public (1) . Thus, due to the massive use of these technolo-
gies, an unprecedented amount of data is fleetingly travel-
ing through high-speed networks all over the world. Natu-
rally, some of these data refer to private user information
such as user location and preferences and should be care-
fully managed.
There is a plethora of applications that utilize user loca-
tions to provide information or services. The following are
some examples:
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(1)The Apple iPhone 3G, equipped with GPS technology, was bought
by more than 1 million people in the first weekend after its launch
in July of 2008 [1].
• The so-called concierge services are good examples
of LBSs that will gain popularity in the near future.
Their main goal is to guide users to the nearest point
of interest, e.g., hospitals, restaurants, bus stops, or
monuments.
• Entertainment and advertising services can also ben-
efit from using the location of mobile users. Gamers
will move from their computer desks to the streets
and virtual worlds will be merged with real ones [2].
In addition, the way people buy will change thanks
to the appearance of interactive location-based ad-
vertisements that will guide users to special offers or
the like [3].
• Last but not least, emergency assistance services are
also relevant examples of LBSs. When emergencies
must be faced, location information automatically
sent by means of a simple phone call can prove ex-
tremely useful to reduce the response time.
The way users access LBSs is changing rapidly. The
simplest form of interaction between a user and an LBS
provider involves a direct message from the former to the
latter including a query and the location to which the
query refers. An example would be the query “Where is
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the nearest bank?”, accompanied by the geographic coor-
dinates of the user’s current location.
Under the assumption that the communication system
used allows the LBS provider to recognize the user ID, there
exists a patent privacy risk. More precisely, when users send
their current locations to a service provider, they are im-
plicitly trusting it because they assume that it will man-
age their location data honestly and will refrain from any
misuse, such as profiling users according to their locations,
the contents of their queries and their activity. However,
providers may not always be trusted and, therefore, more
complex communication schemes to achieve the same goals
without assuming mutual trust are needed.
1.1. Contribution and Plan of the Article
We present a novel protocol that enables users to privately
retrieve location-based information from an untrusted
provider, bearing partial resemblance with mix networks.
Our protocol does not rely on trusted third parties (TTPs)
but on the collaboration among multiple untrusted users.
Instead of using well-known techniques such as common
cloaking areas or sharing of perturbed bogus locations,
our method mixes queries from many users and prevents
providers from binding queries to users, thereby protecting
their privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
summarizes the state of the art in privacy methods for
LBSs. Section 3 presents our protocol for private, TTP-
free, location-based information retrieval through user col-
laboration. A theoretical analysis of this protocol in terms
of privacy, network traffic and processing cost is developed
in Section 4. Section 5 sketches a preliminary analysis of
the feasibility of our assumptions, and discusses a number
of related issues. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2. State of the Art
This section reviews the literature most particularly rele-
vant to our proposed protocol for collaborative privacy ap-
plied to LBSs. More precisely, we provide a brief overview
of the state of the art on privacy in LBSs and on anonymity
based on mix networks, along with an introductory back-
ground regarding attacks against the latter systems.
2.1. Privacy in LBSs
A first step towards user privacy from the legal standpoint
is the publication of privacy policies [4] by service providers
stating what they may or may not do with the informa-
tion collected, enabling users to take legal action against
providers if needed. Under the platform for privacy prefer-
ences project (P3P) [5], the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C) has defined a protocol to systematize the way web
sites such as e-commerce sites declare their use of infor-
mation from browsing users. The geographic location pri-
vacy charter Geopriv of the IETF has proposed their use
in LBSs [6].
An intuitive solution that would preserve user privacy in
terms of both queries and locations is the mediation of a
TTP in the location-based information transaction as de-









Fig. 1. Anonymous access to an LBS provider through a TTP.
in the sense that the provider cannot know the user ID,
but merely the identity IDTTP of the TTP itself inher-
ent in the communication. Alternatively, the TTP may act
as a pseudonymizer by supplying a pseudonym ID’ to the
provider, but only the TTP knows the correspondence be-
tween the pseudonym ID’ and the actual user ID. A con-
venient twist to this approach is the use of digital creden-
tials [7–9] granted by a trusted authority, namely digital
content proving that a user has sufficient privileges to carry
out a particular transaction without completely revealing
their identity. The main advantage is that the TTP need
not be online at the time of service access to allow users to
access a service with a certain degree of anonymity.
Unfortunately, this approach does not prevent the LBS
from inferring the real identity of a user by linking their
location to, say, a public address directory, for instance by
using restricted space identification (RSI) or observation
identification (OI) attacks [10]. In addition, TTP-based so-
lutions require that users shift their trust from the LBS
provider to another party, possibly capable of collecting
queries for diverse services, which unfortunately might fa-
cilitate user profiling via crossreferencing. Finally, traffic
bottlenecks are a potential issue with TTP solutions, and
so is any infrastructure requirement in certain ad hoc net-
works.
We shall see that the main TTP-free alternatives rely
on perturbation of the location information, user collabo-
ration and user-provider collaboration. The principle be-
hind TTP-free perturbative methods for privacy in LBSs






Fig. 2. Users may contact an untrusted LBS provider directly, per-
turbing their location information to help protect their privacy.
untrusted LBS provider directly, perturbing their location
information in order to hinder providers in their efforts
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to compromise user privacy in terms of location, although
clearly not in terms of query contents and activity. This ap-
proach, sometimes referred to as obfuscation, presents the
inherent trade-off between data utility and privacy com-
mon to any perturbative privacy method.
A wide variety of perturbation methods for LBSs has
been proposed [11]. We cannot but briefly touch upon a
few recent ones. In [12], locations and adjacency between
them are modeled by means of the vertices and edges of a
graph, assumed to be known by users and providers, rather
than coordinates in a Cartesian plane or on a spherical sur-
face. Users provide imprecise locations by sending sets of
vertices containing the vertex representing the actual user
location. Alternatively, [13] proposes sending circular areas
of variable center and radius in lieu of actual coordinates.
Finally, we sketch the idea behind [14]. First, users sup-
ply a perturbed location, which the LBS provider uses to
compose replies sorted by decreasing proximity. The user
may stop requesting replies when geometric considerations
guarantee that the reply closest to the undisclosed exact
location has already been supplied.
Fig. 3 is a conceptual depiction of TTP-free methods re-
lying on the collaboration between multiple users. A pro-
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Fig. 3. Communication between a set of users and an untrusted
provider without using a TTP.
posal based on this collaborative principle considers groups
of users that know each other’s locations but trust each
other, who essentially achieve anonymity by sending to
the LBS provider a spatial cloaking region covering the
entire group [15]. Recall that a specific piece of data on
a particular group of individuals is said to satisfy the k-
anonymity requirement (for some positive integer k) if the
origin of any of its components cannot be ascertained, be-
yond a subgroup of at least k individuals [16,17]. As many
collaborative methods, the one just described guarantees
k-anonymity regarding both query contents and location.
Another effort towards k-anonymous LBSs, this time not
assuming that collaborating users necessarily trust each
other, is [18,19]. Fundamentally, k users add zero-mean ran-
dom noise to their locations and share the result to compute
the average, which constitutes a shared perturbed location
sent to the LBS provider.
A third class of TTP-free methods such as [20] builds
upon cryptographic methods for private information re-
trieval (PIR) [21], which may be regarded as a form of un-
trusted collaboration between users and providers. Recall
that PIR enables a user to privately retrieve the contents of
a database, indexed by a memory address sent by the user,
in the sense that it is not feasible for the database provider
to ascertain which of the entries was retrieved [21]. Unfor-
tunately, PIR methods require the provider’s cooperation
in the privacy protocol, are limited to a certain extent to
query-response functions in the form of a finite lookup ta-
ble of precomputed answers, and are burdened with a sig-
nificant computational overhead.
Not surprisingly, a number of proposals for privacy in
LBSs combine several of the elements appearing in all of
the solutions above. Hybrid solutions more relevant to this
work build upon the idea of location anonymizers, that is,
TTPs implementing location perturbative methods [22],
with the aim of hindering RSI and OI attacks, in addition
to hiding the identity of the user. Many of them are based
on the k-anonymity and cloaking privacy criteria [10, 18,
23–26].
Finally, we would like to briefly comment on some re-
cent, rather sophisticated distributed protocols for privacy
in LBSs, which also combine some of the ideas presented.
While they do not assume that users necessarily trust each
other, they do require certain trust relationships between
architectural entities, or provide cloaking regions rather
than exact positions to the LBS provider. The first exam-
ple [27] envisions an architecture where two entities have
access to user identities and location information sepa-
rately. Accordingly, it is assumed that no information that
could compromise location anonymity is exchanged be-
tween those two entities, for instance through auditing of a
trusted mediator. An even more recent example [28] enables
users to achieve location k-anonymity via a distributed,
homomorphic cryptographic protocol. It is assumed that
the location of each user is known by one server, and that
servers do not collude with each other or with users. All
the servers and each user jointly determine whether an area
satisfies k-anonymity without the user revealing her precise
location information to the other servers.
2.2. Anonymization Based on Mix Networks
Although the content of a message can be effectively pro-
tected by cryptographic techniques, this protection alone
does not always guarantee anonymity. Namely, an attacker
can observe the sender of a message and follow the message
up to the receiver, thereby detecting the communication
relation without any need to read the content of the trans-
mitted message. Traffic analysis is the process of intercept-
ing and examining messages in order to deduce informa-
tion from patterns in communication. An example of pro-
tection mechanism, albeit rather obvious and potentially
prohibitively inefficient, is traffic padding.
Chaum devised the idea of mix networks as a better so-
lution to the problem of traffic analysis in a computer net-
work. Fundamentally, a TTP called mix collects messages
from a number of senders and forwards them to their in-
tended receivers, possibly other mixes, rearranging them
with the express purpose of hiding the correspondence be-
tween inputs and outputs. Messages sent to mixes are en-
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crypted using public-key cryptography, in a layered fash-
ion when several mixes are involved. Each mix strips off its
own layer of encryption to reveal where to send the message
next. Even if a single TTP performs both the role of user
and mix, no generality is lost in our discussion by making
a distinction.
There are several anonymous communication proposals
based on the idea of mix networks. They can be roughly
classified into high-latency and low-latency systems. The
former introduce significant delay to attain a high degree of
anonymity against traffic analysis [29, 30]. Naturally, their
main drawback is that they are hardly applicable to real-
time interactive tasks such as web browsing or online chat.
With the aim of overcoming this limitation, low-latency
systems appeared. To attain a higher degree of anonymity,
rather than increasing latency disproportionately, these
systems simply benefit from the networking of a combi-
nation of several mixes frequently accessed by a signifi-
cantly large population of users. Quoting [31], “All mix
systems require that messages to be anonymized should
be relayed through a sequence of trusted intermediate
nodes”. Some of these systems are based on peer-to-peer
communications [32, 33], under the assumption of a very
large interconnected population of trusted users who know
how to reach each other, and who also act as mixes. The
most popular approaches are onion routing [34, 35] and
its second-generation version TOR [36]. Onion routing
uses a single data structure encrypted in a layered fashion
to build an anonymous circuit. Alternatively, TOR uses
an incremental path-building design, where a client who
wishes to communicate with a server negotiates session
keys with each successive hop in the circuit. There exists a
variety of mechanisms for building paths of mixes through
which user messages will be forwarded [37], occasionally
based on predetermined cascades of mixes. A large body
of research, recently surveyed in [38], is concerned with
extending and refining mix-based protocols.
Later on, in Section 3.4, once our own proposal will have
been described in detail, we shall stress the differences be-
tween our protocol and mix networks.
2.3. Attacks Against Mix Networks
Since their introduction in the 80’s [39], mix networks have
been the subject of extensive studies concerned with their
vulnerabilities, limitations and attacks. In the following, we
cannot but roughly sketch some the main types of attacks
studied. For a particularly comprehensive, up-to-date sur-
vey of attacks and proposals, please refer to [38].
Intersection attacks gain information about a targeted
user through repeated observations of anonymity sets to
which the targeted user belongs, that is, sets of possible
identities for a given user determined on the basis of any ob-
servations. Since the intersection of two different anonymity
sets is likely to be smaller than either of the anonymity sets,
due to the assumed regularity in behavior, different inter-
sections of anonymity sets could be used to gain informa-
tion about the targeted user. Specifically, such intersection
attacks may be based on replay, manipulation and blocking
attacks [37].
Disclosure attacks, originally proposed in [40], are a for-
malized variation of intersection attacks. Assume a tar-
geted user commonly communicates withm recipients. In a
first, learning phase, the attacker waits until he observes m
mutually disjoint sets of possible recipients for a targeted
user, R1, . . . , Rm. In a second, excluding phase, further re-
cipient sets inferred from new observations are intersected
with R1, . . . , Rm to refine them until all m recipients are
singled out.
Statistical disclosure attacks [31, 41] are a statistical so-
phistication of the above attacks. The underlying principle
may be expressed intuitively by saying that under reason-
able assumptions, the uncertainty regarding the identity
of the actual recipients of messages by a targeted user may
be probabilistically reduced to an arbitrary degree, given
a sufficiently large number of observations. Very recently,
Bayesian probabilistic inference supported by Markov
chain Monte Carlo numerical methods has been applied to
deanonymize persistent communications [42].
A brief, preliminary discussion on the connection be-
tween these attacks against mix networks and our protocol
may be found in Section 5.4.
3. A Collaborative Protocol for Privacy in LBSs
In this section we present a collaborative protocol that en-
ables a number of users to interact with an LBS in a way
that protects the privacy of their queries and replies. This
is achieved in spite of two assumptions. First, it is assumed
that neither the LBS nor other cooperating users can be
completely trusted regarding the disclosure of a user’s pri-
vate information. Secondly, both the queries and the replies
contain accurate information that may not be perturbed.
Section 3.1 makes our assumptions more precise. Perfor-
mance criteria of interest are listed in Section 3.2. The pri-
vacy protocol proposed is described in Section 3.3, which
relies on the existence of a cooperative structure of users.
We stress the differences with respect to mix networks in
Section 3.4. Section 4 analyzes our solution, mainly in terms
of privacy risk and communication overhead. Later, Sec-
tion 5 will sketch a preliminary analysis of the feasibility of
our assumptions. In particular, security considerations con-
cerning the creation and maintenance of such structure, in-
cluding denial-of-service attacks against it, and the proper
operation of the protocol, are discussed in Section 5.1. User
unreliability and Sybil attacks are discussed in Sections 5.2
and 5.3. A preliminary analysis on the applicability of at-
tacks intended against mix networks and traffic analysis is
provided in Section 5.4.
4
3.1. Hypotheses
In the following, we describe the assumptions on which our
collaborative privacy protocol has been built. We would
like to remark that some are chosen intentionally to discard
scenarios where privacy solutions have already been exten-
sively studied. In particular, we rule out scenarios where the
solution is as conceptually straightforward as introducing
some form of TTP-based anonymization. The ulterior mo-
tivation is to provide a feasible solution to privacy for LBSs
in ad hoc networks, networks where requirements regarding
an underlying infrastructure must be kept to a minimum.
From the point of view of privacy and functional require-
ments, we shall assume the following:
• Users are allowed to cooperate but no party can be
completely trusted, thus no TTP is available.
• Queries submitted to the LBS must be kept private
and accurate, thus they may not be perturbed. In
particular, noise may not be added to the original
user location information to enforce privacy.
• The privacy protocol must be completely transparent
to an arbitrary query-response function implemented
by the LBS, without any significant collaboration of
the provider. This prevents, for instance, the use of
cryptographic mechanisms operating on the assump-
tion of a limited response space, or a lookup table
implementation of the query-response function, such
as [20].
We elaborate on selfish, malicious and generally untrust-
worthy users in Section 5.2.
Regarding network communications, suppose that:
• Knowledge of the user ID is inherent in the communi-
cation system, and no form of anonymization is avail-
able, through a TTP or otherwise. IDs may neither
be shared nor exchanged among users.
• All parties, that is, all users and the LBS, possess
long-term IDs, and any two parties involved in a com-
munication are capable of authenticating each other.
• Further, communication between any two parties is
confidential and prevents traffic analysis.
• Messages exchanged between users may be encrypted
for the LBS to further strengthen confidentiality. In
practice, this would require that the LBS provider
participate in any collusion against a user’s privacy.
Although the above hypotheses essentially preclude Sybil
attacks, we elaborate on this matter in Section 5.3. Note
that our assumption regarding the existence of long-term
IDs is not very restrictive. Otherwise, the concepts of pri-
vacy and anonymity would be hardly meaningful. In cases
where IDs may be legitimately shared, the term user may
simply be redefined as a disjoint user group, according to
how IDs are shared, and the term privacy as group privacy.
Section 5.4 elaborates on the use of cryptographic tech-
niques to provide confidentiality and prevent traffic analy-
sis, and briefly discusses the connection with known attacks
against mix networks. Essentially, the hypotheses concern-
ing secure network communication may be satisfied by the
existence of a public-key infrastructure (PKI) [43], not nec-
essarily online. The very last requirement, in particular,
could be fulfilled by encrypting messages with the public
key of the LBS provider.
Finally, we shall assume the existence of a secure mecha-
nism by means of which users may organize themselves and
adhere to a privacy protocol involving certain message ex-
changes. Particularly, we shall assume that there is a way
to create and efficiently maintain collaborative structures,
which is robust against denial of service attacks. Being not
central to the focus of this work, but essential to its feasi-
bility, the discussion of this assumption is postponed until
Section 5.1.
3.2. Performance Criteria
Before describing our privacy protocol, we would like to
state that we are interested in two types of performance
criteria, namely privacy and network-related cost, which
will be analyzed in Section 4. The main object of the pro-
tocol is to preserve user privacy. By privacy, we strictly
mean anonymity of the query and the response contents,
including location information, as a means to prevent any
malicious party from profiling users according to their loca-
tions, the contents of their queries and their activity. Con-
cordantly, we shall first consider the probability of events
that compromise a user’s privacy by means of collusion of
malicious users and the LBS provider. Secondly, we shall
assess the overhead cost in regard to network connections,
traffic, LBS processing and latency.
Additional performance criteria are resilience against de-
nial of service attacks and costs related to the creation and
maintenance of a collaborative structure enforcing the pri-
vacy protocol. Although these aspects are not analyzed in
detail in Section 4, the discussion in Section 5 argues in fa-
vor of the feasibility of the protocol presented in this work.
3.3. Description of the Protocol Proposed
We now proceed to describe the collaborative protocol for
privacy in LBS proposed in this work, assuming the hy-
potheses of Section 3.1. Before tackling the most general
setting, special cases of gradually increasing complexity are
discussed.
3.3.1. Query Forgery for Private Information Retrieval
Consider first the simplest case when a single user must ac-
cess an LBS, depicted in Fig. 4(a), under the assumptions
of Section 3.1. One way to ensure that the LBS provider is
unable to completely ascertain the user’s actual informa-
tion interests is for the user to accompany his queries with
forged ones, as illustrated in Fig. 4(b). In the figure, the au-
thentic query is labeled with ‘1’, and the forged one, with

















Fig. 4. A single user accessing the LBS provider. A forged query,
accompanying the authentic one, provides a certain degree of privacy.
regarding the forged query as that generated by an imagi-
nary user. The provider cannot discern which user submit-
ted which query. Any policy regarding query forgery must
take into consideration the trade-off among a number of
factors, including not only resilience against statistical pri-
vacy attacks, but also traffic and processing overhead. Ul-
timately, the protocol described in this section will in fact
accommodate any query forgery policy.
3.3.2. Query Permutation on a Chain of Users
We remarked that the single-user case of Section 3.3.1 could
be regarded as the collaboration of two users, each submit-
ting a query to the LBS provider, in such a way that the
provider could not discern which query belonged to whom.
The next setting we would like to consider, represented in
Fig. 5, is an intuitively natural extension of the single-user
case, in Fig. 4(b).
LBSUser 1 User 2 User nUser 3
1 0 0 2 1 1 0 3 2 3 0 n
1 0 0 2 1 1 0 3 2 3 0 n 1
1
Fig. 5. Query permutation on a chain of users.
In this new setting, n users form a chain. User 1, exactly
as in Section 3.3.1, accompanies authentic queries with
forged ones in random order, but sends them to user 2 in
lieu of the LBS provider. User 2 generates their own query,
and then produces a random permutation of the forged
query, user 1’s query, and their own, labeled in the figure
as ‘0’,‘1’ and ‘2’, respectively. The randomly permuted list
of queries is then sent to user 3, who in turn appends their
query, and permutes the resulting list before sending it to
user 4, and so on and so forth. The last user, user n, sub-
mits a random permutation of n+1 queries to the provider
(one of them forged). The point is that neither the provider
nor the intermediate users know for certain which authen-
tic query was generated by whom.
To deliver the corresponding n + 1 replies generated by
the LBS, the process is reversed as shown in Fig. 5. Pre-
cisely, user j deletes their own reply from the list and inverts
their permutations before sending it to user j−1. Note that
user 2 sends two replies to user 1, one corresponding to the
forged query. The overall mechanism is aimed at providing
privacy regarding both queries and replies for all collabo-
rating users, without assuming that the participants may
be trusted. In principle, for each 1 < j < n, user j’s pri-
vacy can only be completely compromised if at least two
users, namely j − 1 and j + 1, collude with each other to
compare the lists of queries (replies) available to them, and
pinpoint query (reply) j. We would like to remark that the
confidentiality of the queries (but not the replies) sent from
one user to another may be strengthened by an additional
encryption reversible by the LBS provider only, e.g., en-
cryption with the public key of the provider. In this way,
two users and the provider would need to collude to reveal
user j’s query. Similarly, the integrity of the replies could
be strengthened, provided that the provider agrees to sign
them with its private key.
3.3.3. Query Permutation on a Trellis of Users
The most general setting proposed, up to small variations,
is depicted in Fig. 6, where users form a trellis of m rows
and n columns. At this point we would like to remark that
LBS
1, 1 1, j 1, n
i, 1 i, j i, n
m, 1 m, j m, n
Fig. 6. Query permutation on a trellis of users.
an entirely analogous protocol to that described next could
be carried out on a trellis with variable column size, with
similar but not identical privacy properties. It will become
clear that the scenario discussed in Section 3.3.2 is simply
the special case when m = 1. In this new setting, users
in the first column generate forged queries and send them
along with their authentic queries to users in the second
column. In general, as illustrated in Fig. 7, user (i, j) in
row i and column j receives permuted queries from users
in column j − 1 when j > 1, or forges queries when j = 1.
Next, the user adds their own query, permutes the result-
1, j-1 1, j+1
i, j-1 i, j i, j+1






2 4 1 5
Fig. 7. User (i, j) adds their own query to those received from the
previous column, permutes the resulting list, splits it and sends the
parts to users in the next column.
ing list, and finally, splits it and sends each part to different
users in the following column j + 1 if j < n, or to the LBS
provider if j = n. The choices regarding the permutation
of the list, its splitting, and the users the parts are sent to,
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are random. Replies are sent back reversing the permuta-
tion and splitting processes, similarly to the case m = 1 in
Section 3.3.2.
The key difference with respect to the case with m = 1
is that more users need to collude to compromise a given
user’s privacy. More precisely, for 1 < j < n, in order
to guarantee that the privacy of user (i, j) be completely
compromised regardless of how queries are split and trans-
mitted, it seems that 2m users, namely all users from the
previous column and the next one, must collude. However,
m + 1 users are enough if we are satisfied with the coinci-
dental configuration where all users in column j−1 collude
with the user in column j+1 which happened to receive the
query. A more detailed analysis is presented in Section 4.1.
Intuition suggests that the random query forwarding pol-
icy may be improved by enforcing maximum diffusion of
queries from a user to the column of recipients. For exam-
ple, if (i, j) has at least m queries, sending at least one to
each of the users in j + 1 may have a positive impact in
terms of probability of privacy breach. Such policy guar-
antees that users in j + 1 do not need to generate forged
queries to protect their privacy against users in j + 2. On
the other hand, users in the first column would still need
to forge m− 1 queries each, to enforce this throughout the
trellis.
3.3.4. Variations of the Privacy Protocol
There exists a number of variations and twists on the pro-
tocol described in Section 3.3, which may be of help when
tailoring an implementation to fit the requirements of a
particular application, with consequent variations in per-
formance in terms of privacy and number of messages. Two
examples follow.
Consider first each of the chains of n users along a row of
the trellis in Section 3.3.3, which is also the case discussed
in Section 3.3.2. The number of queries processed by the
LBS provider for each row can be reduced to the minimum
number n of authentic queries for any n > 3, as shown
in Fig. 8. The only difference with respect to the previous
LBS User 1 User 2 User nUser 3
1 0 0 2 1 1 0 3 2
3 0 n




3 0 n 1
Fig. 8. Query permutation on a chain of users where the forged query
is removed from the list sent to the LBS.
protocol is that user n now sends the permuted list of n+1
queries back to user 1 instead of submitting it to the LBS.
Then, user 1 removes the forged query, sends the resulting
list to the provider, and adds a forged reply to the received
list, which is sent to user n.
As a second example of variation, for 1 < j < n, user
(i, j) in the trellis could split their own query into portions
sent to all users in column j + 1. In this way, a single mali-
cious user in the next column does not suffice for a complete
privacy breach. These portions should be properly tagged
in order for the LBS provider to recombine them. How-
ever, if all users in column j + 1 are malicious, they could
keep track of the recombination tags to discard incomplete
groups of query portions coming from (i, j), in order to
compromise the user’s privacy. At the other extreme, an al-
ternative to reduce the number of messages would consist
in sending the entire query list to a single, randomly chosen
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Fig. 9. Case when user (i, j) sends the entire list of queries to a single
user in the next column.
3.4. Differences with Respect to Mix Networks
We briefly discussed mix networks in Section 2.2 as a TTP-
based, multiparty solution to anonymize network traffic.
We now proceed to stress the differences between our pro-
tocol for privacy in LBSs through user collaboration, and
mix networks. First, the main motivation for our protocol
is to minimize infrastructure requirements by excluding the
involvement of TTPs such as anonymizers or mixes. Ac-
cordingly, as stated in Section 3.1, we do not assume that
any of the parties involved in the query exchange, not even
the users themselves, can be completely trusted. That is in
fact one of the reasons for requiring query forgery. In other
words, in our work, users are not assumed to act as mixes,
in the sense that while they collect, rearrange and forward
messages, are far from being conceivable as TTPs. Clearly,
the above does not preclude the management of encryption
keys from relying on TTPs as part of a PKI, although they
would not need to be online during the query communica-
tion process. In any case, we do not impose the requirement
for additional TTPs.
On the other hand, it is only fair to acknowledge that
threat models for mix networks do consider the possibil-
ity of attackers “who can compromise some fraction of
the onion routers” [36]. Further, the introduction of bogus
queries as a means to protect privacy is by no means new,
as the idea was already introduced in [39].
Secondly, our proposal and mix networks have different
goals. Specifically, the goal of our protocol is to anonymize
a location-based query completely, against the recipient it-
self, namely the LBS provider, whereas mix networks strug-
7
gle to prevent traffic analysis aimed at tracing the connec-
tion between senders and receivers.
Despite these differences, many of the attacks against
mix networks might still apply against our protocol. This
is further discussed in Section 5.4.
4. Privacy and Cost Analysis
In this section we analyze the trellis structure described in
Section 3.3.3 in terms of two contrasting aspects. On the one
hand, we consider the usefulness of this structure to enforce
user privacy. On the other, we study the overhead cost in
regard to network connections, traffic, LBS processing and
latency.
4.1. Privacy
There exists a number of statistical quantities that may
serve as an insightful measure of a user’s privacy in the con-
text of our work. In this section, we are inclined to focus
on a simple quantity ensuring a high degree of mathemat-
ical tractability. Specifically, we shall compute the proba-
bility that the anonymity of the query of a given user is
completely compromised by a group of colluding users. Of
course, if mathematical tractability were not an issue, more
complex privacy measures might have been proposed. For
example, entropy measurements based on the probability
that a query belongs to a user, within a list obtained af-
ter collusion. Or inspired by [44, 45], we could have alter-
natively defined privacy risk as the Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence between the user’s probability distribution of query
values and the population’s. A discussion of privacy mea-
sures is provided in [46].
4.1.1. Assumptions
Interested in a conceptual, preliminary analysis, we shall
simply assume that users disclose their lists of queries and
are willing to collude with other users to compromise a
given user’s privacy, with identical probability 1 − t, in-
dependently from each other, conditioned on the event
that the LBS provider is willing to act maliciously as well.
Loosely speaking, t is the probability that a user can be
trusted, given that the LBS cannot. Conditioning on the
event that the provider is malicious makes the computation
identical regardless of whether queries are encrypted for
the LBS, and yields slightly simpler expressions, omitting
a constant factor, namely the probability that the provider
acts maliciously. Accordingly, the conditional probability
of exactly k users colluding with each other against another
user’s privacy, given that the provider maliciously cooper-
ates, is (1− t)k. More realistic scenarios could of course be
better characterized by more complex probability models.
For example, the risk of being caught might deter a user
from working in collusion with too many others, making
the corresponding probability even smaller than the power
considered here. In addition, also for the sake of simplic-
ity and despite its importance, our analysis neglects the
risks derived from exploiting any statistical dependence be-
tween queries and replies, and any statistical dependence
among numerous repetitions of the protocol proposed in
Section 3.3.3. Confidentiality and traffic analysis are dis-
cussed in Section 5.4. Finally, our privacy analysis focuses
only on queries, rather than replies, due to the similarity
of the alternative analysis.
4.1.2. Probability of Complete Privacy Breach
Privacy is not completely compromised as long as a list
of queries contains at least one query in addition to the
user’s. Provided that users in the first column of the trellis
of Section 3.3.3 submit forged queries, any group of collud-
ing users will be unable to ascertain authentic queries, at
least without further statistical analysis, according to the
assumptions stated above.
For j > 1, consider the case when user (i, j)’s query is
known to a group of users colluding with each other and the
LBS provider. The probability that this situation is guar-
anteed to happen regardless of how query lists are split and
transmitted, requires collusion of the 2m users in columns
j − 1 and j + 1, or merely the m users in column j − 1
if j = n. According to our hypotheses, this probability of
guaranteed complete privacy breach (GCPB) is pGCPB =
(1 − t)2m for 1 < j < n, and (1 − t)m for j = n. Let f
denote the amount of forged queries generated by users in
column 1. As long as f > 0, it is clear that pGCPB = 0 for
j = 1. Observe that by definition pGCPB is a probability
conditioned on the event that the LBS provider acts ma-
liciously, in cooperation with the group of colluding users.
Consequently, the unconditional probability may be even
lower. Table 1 evaluates (1 − t)2m for several values of t
and m, and illustrates what is perhaps the strongest point
of the trellis structure proposed, namely an exponentially
scalable probability of GCPB.
More likely is the case when user (i, j)’s privacy is com-
pletely compromised due to a coincidental configuration of
malicious users and query list splitting, without the a priori
guarantee. For 1 < j < n, for instance, the query of interest
will be disclosed if allm users in column j−1 and the single
user in column j where the query is actually sent collude.
We show in Appendix A that under the mild assumption
of symmetry and random query forwarding, the probabil-
ity of coincidental complete privacy breach (CCPB) is, for
1 < j 6 n,
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Of course, pCCPB = 0 for j = 1 as long as the number of
forged queries f > 0. Implicit in the assumption of random
query forwarding is the possibility that some intermediate
users not receive any queries, which contributes to the prob-
ability of CCPB in the above formula. In a practical situa-
tion, since the (i, j) user sends j+f queries on average, this
can be easily avoided for j > m − f by requiring that at
least a query be forwarded to each user, by making f large
enough, or by allowing intermediate users to forge queries
as well. Concordantly, the formula is best interpreted as an
upper bound on the probability of CCPB.
The appendix also proves the symbolically simpler
bounds
(1− t)m+1 6 pCCPB 6 (1− t)(1− t/m)m. (2)
Both the upper and lower bound are tight for m = 1, but
not in general. To see the the lower bound is not tight,
for instance, note that the only malicious users required in
columns 1, . . . , j − 1 are those observing queries in the list
received by the single malicious user in column j + 1, such
that all queries but (i, j)’s can be discarded. The upper
bound can be loosened on account of the fact that
(1− t)(1− t/m)m 6 (1− t)e−t,
inequality asymptotically tight as m goes to infinity.
The derivation in the appendix concludes with the ap-
proximation for t ' 1





+ o(t− 1). (3)
This approximation may be interpreted as the probability
that user (1, j + 1) is malicious, and that although no user
acts maliciously in columns 1, . . . , j − 1, unfortunately no
queries are received by user (i, j). If the query forwarding
policy were not random, but instead guaranteed that at
least one query reaches each intermediate user, the first-
order approximation shown would be trivially zero.
Fig. 10 depicts the probability of CCPB according to (1),
plots the bounds (2), the approximation (3), and includes
the much lower probability of GCPB (1−t)2m as reference.
The plots suggest that larger m and f help reduce pCCPB,
in keeping with the exact formula (1). The fact that the
approximation (3) becomes (1 − t) e−(j+f−1) in the limit
of infinite m means that, for trustworthy users, pCCPB de-
creases exponentially with j and f , but approaches a satu-
ration level for large m. This phenomenon is supported by
the curves depicted for t = 9/10 in Fig. 10.
The intraquery splitting alternative commented on in
Section 3.3.3 may be an additional degree of freedom in the
protocol to alter the probability of CCPB, but the proba-
bility of GCPB will remain equal to (1− t)2m. While both
probabilities can always be reduced by generating addi-
tional forged queries at intermediate users, this comes at
the cost of network traffic, and LBS processing time.
4.2. Cost
We now turn to considerations of cost, briefly analyzing the
overhead incurred by the privacy protocol on a trellis of m
rows and n columns, in regard to network connections, traf-
fic, LBS processing and latency. The analysis is restricted
to queries. The corresponding analysis for responses is en-
tirely analogous. For simplicity, costs regarding structure
creation and maintenance, for example using the proce-
dures discussed in Section 5.1, are not taken into account,
although we acknowledge they may be noticeable, particu-
larly in mobile environments with long backhaul links.
Results are summarized in Table 2. It is important to
Max. # of messages transmitted m2 (n− 1) + m O(m2 n)











Relative overhead (w.r.t. mn) n+1
2
+ f O(n)











# of queries processed by LBS m(n + f) O(mn)





Summary of cost analysis, assuming f does not scale with m or n.
note that the results in Landau asymptotic notation im-
plicitly assume that f does not scale with m or n. Under a
random query forwarding policy, this entails the possibility
that intermediate users may not receive queries from pre-
vious columns. This rules out the case when f = m − 1,





















(a) m = 5, j = 5, f = 4




















(b) m = 1, . . . , 10, j = 5, f = 4





















(c) m = 5, j = 2, . . . , 10, f = 4





















(d) m = 5, j = 5, f = 1, . . . , 10
Fig. 10. Probability of CCPB (1), together with the upper and lower bounds (2), the approximation (3) for t ' 1, and probability of GCPB.
teed to receive queries from previous columns, as long as
queries are diffused properly.
First, we claim that the number of messages containing
queries in the trellis, equal to the number of connections,
is bounded from above as follows:
Nmessages 6 m2 (n− 1) +m = O(m2 n).
Indeed, each of them users in each of the first n−1 columns
may communicate with up to m users in the next column.
This represents m2 (n − 1) connections, to which we need
to add the m connections with the LBS established by the
m users in the last column. If privacy were not an issue,
the mn users in the trellis could directly send their queries
to the LBS provider, which would require only mn query
messages. The relative overhead of the (maximum) num-
ber of query messages Nmessages with respect to the ideal
minimum mn, attainable with perfect trust, is the ratio
m (n−1)+1
n , asymptotically equal to m as n goes to infinity.
We show now that the total traffic measured in number









where f is the number of forged queries generated by each
user in the first column. The claim follows from the fact
that a total of m(j+ f) queries are transmitted from users
in column j = 1, . . . , n to either users in column j + 1 if




m(j + f) = m
 n∑
j=1
j + n f
 ,
equal to the expression claimed. If the LBS were completely
trusted, then a single query could be generated by each of
the mn users and transmitted directly. Hence, the relative
traffic overhead is n+12 + f , which approaches the linear
function n/2 as n goes to infinity.
We may draw two corollaries from the previous analysis.
On the one hand, we already mentioned that the number
of queries received by the LBS provider is m(n + f) =
O(mn), which can be regarded as the LBS processing cost,
with relative overhead 1 + f/n, vanishing in the limit of
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gives the average query message length, measured in num-
ber of queries, provided that the maximum number of
messages Nmessages is attained, or more generally, a lower
bound. This quotient is approximately n2m for m and n
large.
One of the strengths of the collaborative protocol pro-
posed becomes apparent in light of the above cost calcula-
tions and the privacy analysis of Section 4.1.2. Specifically,
we benefit from an exponentially decreasing probability of
GCPB, at the expense of linearly increasing relative over-
heads.
Finally, one of the fundamental performance criteria of
the protocol is clearly the latency inherent to the fact that
users must wait for others to cooperate before sending their
queries, similarly to mix networks. Intuitively speaking, in
the special case when users only participate in the protocol
when they have a query available, a latency constraint in
turn imposes an upper bound on the average number of
participants. In light of the privacy analysis of Section 4.1,
this suggests the existence of a trade-off between privacy
and latency. Of course, a more forgiving trade-off could be
attained in the case when users participate regardless of
whether they have a query available.
The following back-of-the-envelope analysis will help us
quantify this statement. Suppose that the entire popula-
tion of users generates (authentic) queries according to a
Poisson process at a rate of λ queries per time unit. Let L
denote the maximum amount of time a user is willing to
wait from the instant it starts to form a new trellis, until
the trellis is completely filled with users willing to query
the LBS provider. Again, assume users only participate in
the protocol when they have a query available. Then, the
number of additional users available to join the trellis dur-
ing this period is a Poisson random variable with expecta-
tion λL. Consequently, the expectation of the number mn
of users in this new trellis is at most 1 + λL. For the sake
of argument, assume that the population is large and suffi-
ciently active, disregard the possibility of repeated queries
from the same user within a short latency period, and that
consequently, roughly, mn ' λL. Under this approxima-
tion, for example, a total population of 100 000 users, each
of them producing 1 query per hour but willing to tolerate
a latency of only 1 second, may be able to participate in
trellises of the order of up to
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members with similar behavior.
(2)If f does however scale with m, as in the variation f = m − 1
described in Section 4.1, then the number of queries processed by







We proceed to discuss in greater detail the assumptions
of Section 3.1. Even though the focus of this paper is to
present and analyze a collaborative privacy protocol, we
would like to provide at least a brief analysis of feasibility,
with emphasis on the creation and maintenance of a collab-
orative structure supporting our protocol. Concordantly,
Section 5.1 suggests that a reasonably secure underlying
structure is feasible, at least in certain scenarios. Next, we
elaborate on the rest of hypotheses of Section 3.1. Our dis-
cussion occasionally relies on the existence of a PKI. The
feasibility of PKIs in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs),
one of our scenarios of interest, is tackled in [43].
5.1. Creation and Maintenance of a Collaborative Structure
We consider now the creation and maintenance of the struc-
ture assumed at the end of Section 3.1, which serves as ba-
sis for the privacy protocol described in Section 3.3, partic-
ularly in the form of the trellis of Section 3.3.3. A simple
protocol is presented first, merely as an argument in fa-
vor of the feasibility of the privacy protocol, under small-
scale scenarios. We emphasize at this point that the effi-
cient, robust, secure creation and maintenance of a large-
scale, long-lived collaborative structure is by no means a
trivial problem, but an interesting open challenge. Indeed,
the feasible sizes of such collaborative structure, and its
precise suitability to static and dynamic networks, may not
be trivial matters, and they are ultimately subject to the
specific requirements and acceptable trade-offs of the tar-
get application, including at least considerations of privacy,
traffic overhead and latency. Fortunately, the privacy anal-
ysis of Section 4.1 suggests that even a small number of
participants may suffice, as the probability of GCPB scales
exponentially, fact illustrated in Table 1.
Many of the hypotheses for our privacy protocol in Sec-
tion 3.1, discussed in greater detail in the following sub-
sections, are just as relevant to our discussion on the cre-
ation and maintenance of the structure. For example, we
assume Sybil attacks are not an issue in the creation and
maintenance of the structure, according to the authentica-
tion hypotheses of Section 3.1, on which we elaborate in
Section 5.3.
5.1.1. Simple Scenario
Focusing on feasibility rather than efficiency, we outline
a simple, small-scale version of a protocol for creating a
short-lived collaborative structure. Basically, we propose
user grouping via broadcast or multicast communication.
In addition, we define an ordering in the trellis structure
indirectly determined by the user IDs of its members, rather
than an ordering dictated by a cluster coordinator. The
purpose of this ordering is to make it difficult to collude
against a user’s privacy through strategic positioning in the
trellis.
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More specifically, recall that we assumed in Section 3.1
that, essentially, user IDs where not interchangeable and
user communication was authenticated. Consistently, con-
sider a group of N users with authenticated identities
ID1, . . . , IDN . Let h be a common hash function, known by
all users, with the usual cryptographic properties, includ-
ing unfeasible computation or modification of input given
a fixed output. In the following, we shall refer to the bit-
string alphabetical ordering of h(ID1), . . . , h(IDN ) as the
ID hash ordering of the N users. In the trellis setting of
Section 3.3.3, assume that vacant positions, either during
a creation or a maintenance phase, are filled rowwise, i.e.,
in the order (1, 1), (1, 2), . . . , (1, n), (2, 1), . . . , (m,n), in
accordance with the ID hash ordering of its members. The
use of h(ID) in lieu of the ID value should hinder colluding
attackers in their efforts to compromise a user’s privacy by
positioning themselves in sensitive locations of the trellis,
particularly the previous and next columns.
As for grouping via broadcast, we assume that user clus-
ters will be formed by a small number of users capable of
intercommunication. The creation of such clusters may be
accomplished by means of the following simple protocol:
1. When user u wants to create a cluster, it broadcasts
a request message JoinREQ(u).
2. Any user v in the communication range of u, with a
query ready to be sent, wishing to take part in the
collaborative structure, broadcasts the acknowledg-
ment JoinACK(u, v).
Users that receive both the JoinREQ(u) request and the
JoinACK(u, v) acknowledgments are included in the clus-
ter. In this way, all users in the group know the identities
of its participants, together with the specific positioning in
the trellis structure, determined by the ID hash ordering
described above.
5.1.2. More General Considerations
Having presented a simple protocol for the creation of a
collaborative structure as a feasibility argument, we now
comment on some of the issues involved in tackling a more
general version of the problem, more efficiently, thereby
widening its range of applications. For example, the simple
protocol of Section 5.1.1 only considers the creation but
not the maintenance of a cluster. If the cluster is not short-
lived, but users wish to keep on sending queries, it seems
more efficient to maintain the group already formed than
to create a new one for each set of queries. Further, in light
of Section 4, it is clear that user preferences concerning
privacy and latency should be appropriately managed by
the protocol, particularly when it comes to setting the size
parameters m and n.
In general, we wish to implement an efficient protocol
for the creation and maintenance of a collaborative struc-
ture, in such a way that the privacy protocol is enforced,
and in particular, guaranteeing a certain level of robust-
ness against denial-of-service attacks but also accidental
network or device failure. A number of techniques in the
literature may be exploited to this end.
As an illustrative example, if the privacy protocol is to
be used in MANETs, then the creation and maintenance of
the trellis structure may reuse existing techniques for clus-
ter management. A survey on clustering in MANETs can
be found in [47]. In these clustering protocols, there is no
central entity that manages the clusters of the network. In-
stead, users interact directly in a peer-to-peer fashion. Oc-
casionally, users will act as cluster heads, leading the orga-
nization of clusters among peers [48,49]. Since our privacy
protocol is not based on any TTP, it seems equally conve-
nient for the ad hoc clustering to be self-organized as well.
5.2. Untrustworthy Users
We elaborate on the hypotheses in Section 3.1 regarding
selfish, malicious and generally untrustworthy users, and
focus our discussion on one of our main scenarios of inter-
est, namely MANETs. Untrustworthy users in MANETs
may be simply selfish or intentionally malicious, but may
also fail to comply with a particular protocol due to net-
work or device failure. Specifically, selfish users may refrain
from carrying out parts of a particular protocol in order to
save power, according to the dire energy constraints mobile
devices are commonly subject to. Fortunately, reputation
systems can frustrate the intentions of selfish users, acting
against observable misbehavior to enforce cooperation. In
this way, if a node does not behave cooperatively, the af-
fected nodes may decide to deny reciprocal cooperation.
As for dishonest, malicious users, they attempt to com-
promise the quality of the LBS, perhaps severely. Hence, it
is only natural to implement measures to detect and expel
them from the collaborative structure [50]. It is clearly in
the interest of the service provider and of the rest of users
to cooperate to this end. For instance, if a benign user ob-
serves inappropriate behavior or fails to receive appropriate
responses from another user, it can notify the LBS provider,
who may in turn decide to expel the malicious user. Mes-
sages passed between parties may be signed to secure the
implementation of these countermeasures. One way for the
provider to effectively expel users from the service is based
on the use of authorization credentials. Precisely, the LBS
provider may issue short-lived authorization credentials,
such as attribute certificates, to users allowed to use the
service. If a user is detected as dishonest or malicious, no
further authorization credentials are issued to that user.
A number of reputation systems dealing with user mis-
behavior have been proposed in the literature. Examples
include CORE [51], CONFIDANT [52], SAFE [53] and
OCEAN [54]. Further information on trust and reputation
systems over ad hoc networks can be found in [55]. Clearly,
such systems must be able to make decisions taking into
account the realistic possibility of unintended network or
device failure, detectable or not.
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5.3. Sybil Attacks
We now turn to one the hypotheses in Section 3.1, namely
the assumption that user IDs may be neither exchanged
nor shared. Sybil attacks [56] are those in which an attacker
forges an identity, and according to [57], “The Sybil attack
can occur in a distributed system that operates without a
central authority to verify the identities of each commu-
nicating entity.” In our setting, a successful Sybil attack
means that a single user may act as different users in the
cluster, possibly one of them being the cluster head. In that
case, the privacy of honest users could be in jeopardy since a
single user can collect queries from different users and exert
managing responsibilities on the collaborative structure.
As we already mentioned in Section 3.1, our hypotheses
essentially preclude Sybil attacks. In practice, this can be
accomplished, for example, by enabling parties to authen-
ticate to each other through PKI certificates. In any case,
a number of techniques exist in order to counter this type
of attacks [57], but a detailed discussion is out of the scope
of this work.
5.4. Confidentiality Attacks and Traffic Analysis
Finally, we would like to elaborate on the hypothesis in
Section 3.1 regarding confidentiality of the communication
between users, not only to the LBS provider, and regard-
ing measures to prevent traffic analysis, as defined in Sec-
tion 2.2. This hypothesis is particularly critical in wireless
environments, physically more sensitive to eavesdropping.
However, it is not clear that the volatile nature of ad hoc
networks could not also play partly in favor of privacy, say
by adding uncertainty to an attacker’s observations or by
making it more difficult to gain control over or information
from a number of independent users.
Suppose that malicious users gain access to the content,
or even just the length, of the queries received and sent by
a target user in the trellis structure of Section 3.3.3. Then
these malicious users may be able to ascertain which query
was inserted by the target user, and if they collude with
the LBS provider, may be able to decipher the contents of
the query, or in many cases, at least make certain infer-
ences that may compromise its privacy. Obviously, similar
considerations apply to the replies of the LBS.
We sketch a simple cryptographic procedure that helps
prevent confidentiality attacks and traffic analysis. The no-
tation EK(M) denotes the encryption of a message M with
a key K, and (M1,M2) denotes the concatenation of mes-
sages M1 and M2. Suppose that user A in the trellis wishes
to send a query Q to user B, through a confidential chan-
nel protected with the session key KAB. The sender A also
knows the public key PLBS of the LBS provider, and gener-
ates a key KALBS that will be sent to the provider, in order
for the provider to encrypt the reply to the query Q. The
sender’s query is encapsulated in the message
A→ B : EKAB [EPLBS (Q,KALBS)].
To hinder traffic analysis, assume that all pairs of queries
and reply keys (Q,KALBS) fit in a block of common size,
for example an RSA cryptogram, commonly after padding.
Naturally, a user waits until all queries are received before
composing and sending the permuted list containing them,
just as mixes do, so that message timing cannot be easily
exploited to unveil input-output correspondences. Q may
of course be the entire query or actually denote the portion
of the query we wish to keep private, such as the user coor-
dinates. Provided that the pairs (Q,KALBS) are sufficiently
small, conceivably the entire list of queries sent to the same
receiver could be included in a single, ciphered message.
Despite the differences highlighted in Section 3.4, just
as with mix networks, our protocol may be vulnerable to,
but also benefit from the solutions proposed against, many
of the attacks studied reviewed in Section 2.3. An exten-
sive treatment could very well be the objective of future re-
search. Nevertheless, further to the above ideas, we would
like to continue our preliminary discussion by pointing out
the differences and similarities between attacks against mix
networks and against our protocol.
Differently from mix networks, we introduce forged
queries that in principle may be constructed to disguise
the probabilistic peculiarities of a user’s preferences with
respect to the overall population, both in terms of loca-
tions and questions asked. We saw in Section 4.1 that these
forged queries enhance the overall privacy of all the users
in the trellis they propagate through. However, similarly
to mix networks, there is an inherent, complex trade-off
between the degree of anonymity attained, and parameters
such as delay, population volume and activity, and traffic
overhead. We shall analyze this trade-off from the per-
spective of quantitative criteria in Section 4. Bear in mind
that the determination of some of the limitations of mix
networks in the literature may be regarded also as a coun-
termeasure against an attack, in the sense that it provides
a design guideline or boundary. For example, [40] analyzes
attacks whose success depends on the volume of the pop-
ulation of senders and receivers, the number of receivers a
sender communicates with, and the number of communi-
cations observed by an attacker. In Section 4.1, we define a
probability of privacy breach that depends on the number
of simultaneously malicious users. Clearly, sophisticated
statistical attacks against mix networks such as [42] are
feasible against our protocol as well, a fact that seems to
support the intuition that in any system, observability
reduces anonymity, to a degree that depends on the com-
plexity or cost of the attack and the anonymity defenses.
6. Conclusion
LBSs are undoubtedly essential representatives of the ICTs.
Due to their inherent capability to infer private information
from LBSs users, techniques to protect the user privacy are
of paramount importance. In this work, we have proposed
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a collaborative privacy protocol for LBSs that despite not
requiring TTPs, is highly scalable in terms of privacy risk.
A main motivation for our protocol is to minimize in-
frastructure requirements by excluding the involvement of
TTPs such as anonymizers or mix networks, aside from a
PKI. In our work, users are not assumed to act as mixes,
in the sense that while they collect, rearrange and forward
messages, they are not assumed to be trustworthy. That is
in fact one of the reasons for requiring query forgery. On
the other hand, it is only fair to acknowledge that threat
models for mix networks do consider the possibility of at-
tackers who can compromise a fraction of the mixes, and
the principle of query forgery for query protection is by
no means new. In any case, the goal of our protocol is to
anonymize a location-based query completely against the
recipient itself, namely the LBS provider, whereas mix net-
works strive to prevent traffic analysis aimed at tracing the
connection between senders and receivers. In other words,
we design a structure for private retrieval of LBS infor-
mation, composed only by collaborating albeit untrusted
users, endowed with various convenient degrees of freedom
regarding the trade-off between privacy, traffic overhead
and latency.
Precisely, another of the main strengths of the protocol
is that it benefits from an exponentially decreasing proba-
bility of guaranteed privacy breach, at the expense of only
linearly increasing relative communication costs, with re-
spect to the size parameters of the trellis.
More specifically, users group themselves into a trellis of
m rows and n columns, where queries are exchanged and
permuted in such a way that privacy is preserved through-
out to a scalable degree. In fact, complete privacy breach is
only guaranteed under the collusion of 2m users together
with the LBS provider, increasingly unlikely with large m .
Assuming that users act maliciously with probability 1− t
independently from each other, conditioned on the event
that the provider is also malicious, the probability of guar-
anteed privacy breach is given by the exponential expres-
sion (1− t)2m.
Regarding network costs, the number of connections and
query messages required by our protocol in them-by-n trel-
lis is O(m2 n), and the total number of queries transmitted
through the trellis is O(mn2). Relative to the minimum of
mn attained in an ideal scenario with nonmalicious par-
ticipants, the corresponding overhead is linear, precisely,
O(m) and O(n) respectively.
Provided that users in the first column generate a fixed
number of queries, the total number of queries processed
by the LBS is O(mn), and the relative overhead is asymp-
totically 1. We describe simple variations of the protocol to
remove the need for forged query processing altogether. In
addition, the privacy protocol is completely transparent to
the implementation of the query-response function in the
LBS. This is an advantage with respect to cryptographic
PIR mechanisms operating on the assumption of a reduced
response space, for instance, a lookup table implementa-
tion of the query-response function.
There exists a trade-off between privacy and latency, due
to the fact that users must wait for others to cooperate
before sending their queries, and that a latency constraint
in turn imposes un upper bound on the average number of
participants in the trellis.
Creating and maintaining the ad hoc network structure
needed for our protocol has been shown to be feasible with
a small number of users. This may be sufficient in practi-
cal applications because our proposal does not need a large
number of participants, due to the exponentially low likeli-
hood of privacy breach. However, an interesting challenge
arises from the fact that the protocol may be improved by
devising a completely secure and more efficient mechanism
to create and maintain collaborative structures, and to en-
force the privacy protocol presented, in particular against
denial of service attacks, and for large-scale structures.
Another future research direction arises naturally from
the acknowledgment that sophisticated statistical attacks
against mix networks are feasible against our protocol as
well, a fact that seems to support the intuition that in any
system, observability reduces anonymity, to a degree that
depends on the complexity or cost of the attack and of the
anonymity defenses.
Even though the main motivation of this work is LBSs,
our protocol is, in principle, applicable beyond LBSs to any
sort of PIR, in the sense that the entire query content is
anonymized, not only the location information. An exam-
ple of application, alternative to LBSs, is private Internet
search. In other words, no requirements are made regard-
ing the properties, mathematical or otherwise, of the query
information protected, nor is this information perturbed in
any way. This is an advantage with respect to other pro-
tocols for privacy in LBSs that assume, for example, that
a set of locations can be added, and consequently exploit
cryptographic homomorphisms, or send perturbed or even
ambiguous location information, such as a region rather
than a point.
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Appendix A. Probability of Coincidental
Complete Privacy Breach
We prove the mathematical assertions on the probability of
coincidental complete privacy breach in the paper, specifi-
cally, (1) and (2) in Section 4.1.2.





P{CCPB|query sent to (i′, j + 1)}
× P{query sent to (i′, j + 1)}
= mP{CCPB|query sent to (1, j + 1)} 1
m
= P{CCPB|query sent to (1, j + 1)}, (A.1)
where the event “query sent to (i′, j + 1)” indicates that
the user of interest sent their own query to (i′, j+ 1). Thus
without loss of generality we may assume that (i, j) sent
their query to user (1, j+1). Note that if (1, j+1) were not
malicious, their query and (i, j)’s would be undistinguish-
able by a privacy attacker.
Let j > 1. Denote by the r.v.’s B1, . . . Bj−1 the num-
ber of benign users in the respective columns, taking
values between 0 and m. Consider the event that B1 =














We now compute the probability, conditioned on this
event, that no benign user in column k = 1, . . . , j−1 sends
their query to (i, j), such that it remains unseen by ma-
licious users. The assumption of random query forward-
ing yields the probability (1 − 1m )bj−1 in the special case
when k = j − 1. For k = j − 2, this probability becomes(
1− bj−1m 1m
)bj−2
















for k = 1. The prob-
ability of CCPB given the number of benign users in each
column is the probability that user (1, j + 1) is malicious,
and no benign user in columns 1 through j − 1 sends their
query to (i, j), such that it is unobserved by any malicious

























P{CCPB|b1, . . . , bj−1}
× P{b1, . . . , bj−1}
immediately gives (1).
We now prove the bounds (2), which, interestingly, reflect
the behavior of (1, j+1) and users in column j−1 only. The
lower bounds follows immediately from (A.1) and the fact
that CCPB is achieved in particular when (1, j+ 1) and all
users in column j− 1 are malicious. The probability that a
user in column j−1 is benign and sends their query to (i, j)
is t/m by symmetry. Hence, (1− t/m)m is the probability
that all users in column j − 1 are either malicious or do
not send their query to (i, j). CCPB requires this outcome,
and that user (1, j + 1) be malicious. This establishes the
upper bound.
Finally, to compute the first-order Taylor approxima-
tion (3), we may neglect all but the term of (1) corre-
sponding to b1 = · · · = bj−1 = m, because they contain
higher powers of 1 − t. But the first-order approximation
to a function of the form (1 − t)f(t) at 1 (for any differ-
entiable f) is simply (1 − t)f(1). (In fact, regardless of
whether random query forwarding is enforced, pCCPB =
(1− t) P{CCPB|m, . . . ,m}.)
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